

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 18264 070942Z

15

ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 AEC-05 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-05 IO-10

L-02 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01 SAJ-01

SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 RSC-01 NSC-05 /085 W

----- 119296

R 070843Z DEC 74

FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5190

DIA WASHDC

INFO USMISSION NATO

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

CINCEUR

CINCLANT

CINCPAC

CINCUSAREUR

CINCUSNAVEUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 18264

CINCEUR FOR POLAD

CINCLANT FOR POLAD

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

CINCUSAREUR FOR POLAD

CINCUSNAVEUR FOR POLAD

FOR DIA REF IR 6 901 1071 74

E.O. 11652 GDS

TAGS: PFOR, PARM, UR, US

SUBJ: USA INSTITUTE OFFICIAL ON ARMS CONTROL, STRATEGIC ISSUES

REF: A) MOSCOW 13588, B) MOSCOW 16972

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 MOSCOW 18264 070942Z

1. SUMMARY. DURING CALL BY POLCOUNS ON G.A. TROFIMENKO,

CHIEF OF THE FOREIGN POLICY DEPARTMENT OF THE USA INSTITUTE, TROFIMENKO MADE FOLLOWING POINTS ON ARMS CONTROL QUESTIONS: HE CALLED THE VLADIVOSTOK AGREEMENT THE BEST POSSIBLE UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, THOUGH NOTED THAT IT ALLOWED "TERRIBLY HIGH" NUMBER OF WARHEADS; CONTENDED THAT THE FBS ISSUE WOULD NOW PROBABLY HAVE TO BE ADDRESSED IN THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS; AND IN A SURPRISING SHIFT FROM THE EARLIER STAND TAKEN BY THE USA INSTITUTE ON THE SCHLESINGER DOCTRINE, COMMENTED THAT, IN LIGHT OF THE VLADIVOSTOK AGREEMENT AND THE LARGE NUMBER OF WARHEADS IT ALLOWS, MAIN SOVIET OBJECTION TO THE DOCTRINE NO LONGER RELEVANT. END SUMMARY.

2. TROFIMENKO SAID THAT THE AGREEMENT REPRESENTED "A LIMIT ON LAUNCHERS FOR THE SOVIET UNION AND A LIMIT ON MIRV'S FOR THE U.S." HE HAD EXPECTED A LIMIT OF ABOUT 800 ON MIRV'S, BASING THE LIMIT ON PRESENT U.S. CAPABILITIES, AND WAS SURPRISED AT THE INCREASE. IN DISCUSSING THE TALKS FORESEEN FOR 1980-81 ON REDUCTION IN THESE NUMBERS, HE NOTED IN PASSING THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD BE UNABLE TO REDUCE TOO FAR AS LONG AS CHINA REMAINS HOSTILE. HE IMPLIED UNDERSTANDING AS TO REASONS FOR SOME CRITICISM IN THE U.S. OF THE AGREEMENT, BUT NOTED THAT "THOSE OF US WHO SPECIALIZE IN THIS AREA" KNOW THAT THE AGREEMENT IS AS GOOD AS ANYONE COULD EXPECT UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES.

3. TROFIMENKO COMMENTED THAT SINCE FBS HAS BEEN DROPPED FROM THE SALT-2 AGENDA, HE EXPECTED THAT THE SUBJECT "WOULD SOMEHOW BE INCLUDED" IN MBFR. THE "PRESENT BALANCE IN EUROPE" HE CONTINUED, IS MADE UP IN PART ON THE NATO SIDE BY AMERICAN FORWARD-BASED SYSTEMS, AND NATO, IN ASKING FOR REDUCTIONS BY THE WARSAW PACT, SHOULD KEEP THIS IN MIND.

4. WHEN ASKED THE EFFECT OF THE VLADIVOSTOK AGREEMENT ON THE SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARD THE SCHLESINGER DOCTRINE, TROFIMENKO REPLIED THAT "IT WOULD STILL BE NEGATIVE." HE CONTINUED, HOWEVER, THAT THE MAIN ARGUMENT AGAINST IT, FROM THE SOVIET POINT OF VIEW, WAS THE DANGER THAT IN ESTABLISHING THE NEED FOR MORE TARGETS IT WOULD

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 MOSCOW 18264 070942Z

ALSO CREATE A NEED FOR MORE WARHEADS, "BOTH ON THE U.S. SIDE AND THE SOVIET SIDE." NOW THAT THE VLADIVOSTOK AGREEMENT HAS MADE PROVISION FOR SUCH A LARGE NUMBER OF WARHEADS, THIS FACTOR IS NOT SO IMPORTANT. HE ADDED THAT THE SOVIET SIDE NOW COULD ALSO MOVE TO A SIMILAR STRATEGY. SINCE THE DELIVERY SYSTEMS ON BOTH SIDES WILL BE SIMILAR IN MANY WAYS AND IN TOTAL NUMBERS, SIMILAR STRATEGIES WOULD PROBABLY ALSO EVOLVE.

5. IN A DISCUSSION ON THE ORGANIZATION OF DISARMAMENT AFFAIRS IN THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT, TROFIMENKO MENTIONED THAT WORK IN THAT AREA IN MFA IS CHanneLED THROUGH "NOVIKOV," EMBASSY PRESUMES THIS PERHAPS MAY BE KIRILL VASIL'YEVICH NOVIKOV, A FORMER HEAD OF THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS DIVISION (UNTIL 1973, WHEN ISRAEL'YAN SUCCEEDED HIM) AND FORMER MEMBER OF THE MFA COLLEGIUM. EMBASSY'S FILES CONTAIN NOTHING ON NOVIKOV SINCE 1973, AND WE WOULD APPRECIATE ANY INFO DEPARTMENT HAS ON HIM.

6. COMMENT: TROFIMENKO IS NOT IN ANY FORMAL SENSE A POLICY-MAKING OFFICIAL, BUT WE BELIEVE THAT HE IS WELL-INFORMED ON SOVIET OFFICIAL THINKIN, PARTICULARLY ON STRATEGIC MATTERS. HIS ASSERTION THAT FBS WILL NOW MOVE TO THE MBFR FORUM IS NOT UNEXPECTED; HE DID DISPLAY CAUTION, HOWEVER, ON QUESTION OF HOW THE SUBJECT WILL BE ADDRESSED, NOTING THAT IT WOULD PERHAPS "NOT BE PART OF THE OFFICIAL AGENDA." HIS REMARKS ON THE SCHLESINGER DOCTRINE ARE OF CONSIDERABLE INTEREST, SINCE USA INSTITUTE HAS BEEN SOURCE OF MOST PROPAGANDA DIRECTED AGAINST THAT POLICY. HIS OWN ARTICLE IN THE SEPTEMBER ISSUE OF THE USA JOURNAL (REF A), AND A SUBSEQUENT ARTICLE BY MIL'SHTEIN AND SEMEYKO, TWO OF HIS COLLEAGUES (REF B) HEAPED ABUSE ON THE DOCTRINE AS DESTABLIZING IN THAT IT MADE NUCLEAR WAR "THINKABLE" AND CONTRIBUTED TO THE R&D RACE IN ARMS TECHNOLOGY.
STOESSEL

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: AGREEMENTS, DISARMAMENT, NEGOTIATIONS, ARMS CONTROL MEETINGS, PEACE TALKS, MEETING REPORTS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 07 DEC 1974
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: golinofr
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974MOSCOW18264
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D740356-0088
From: MOSCOW
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t19741252/aaaabsjb.tel
Line Count: 143
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION ACDA
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 3
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: A) MOSCOW 13588, B) MOSCOW 16972
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: golinofr
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 26 MAR 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <26 MAR 2002 by shawdg>; APPROVED <28 MAY 2002 by golinofr>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: USA INSTITUTE OFFICIAL ON ARMS CONTROL, STRATEGIC ISSUES
TAGS: PFOR, PARM, UR, US, (TROFIMENKO)
To: STATE DIA
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005